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INTRODUCTION

The ultimate goal of the legal system is to resolve controversies by
* Judge, 285th District Court, Bexar County, Texas. B.A., Austin College; M.A., J.D.,
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producing results that are correct and at the same time final. One
task of the law of judgments is to balance the inherent tension between the goals of correctness and finality. Trial courts must be given
leeway to ensure that their judgments are just and fair, correct and
free from error. But at some point, lawsuits must come to an end,
because unending litigation is itself an injustice. Litigants and third
parties can hardly rely on judgments that can be modified or set aside
by the trial court. A judgment that is subject to change does not settle
anything. Consequently, the law must establish some point at which
the trial court loses the power to change its rulings.
This article surveys the Texas rules that set the boundaries of the
trial court's authority to modify its judgments.' Part II of the article
examines the trial court's plenary power to modify its judgments, and
Part III discusses the court's authority to make corrections nunc pro
tunc2 after its jurisdiction has expired. The article will focus on modifications by the trial judge who heard the case and will not explore
such procedures as direct appeal, bill of review, or collateral attack, in
which a judgment is attacked in a different forum.3
1. The article deals with general principles that apply to all civil judgments, not with
rules that are unique to certain kinds'of cases. For example, in injunction cases and family law
cases, there are special rules that authorize trial courts to modify final judgments. Trial courts
have exclusive jurisdiction "to modify or vacate their judgments granting permanent injunctions because of changed conditions." City of Tyler v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 405
S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. 1966). But see State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. 1984) (trial
court cannot modify temporary injunction that has been affirmed on appeal, except after hearing on permanent injunction).
In family law cases, sections 3.70-3.77 of the Family Code grant trial courts power to enforce and clarify their judgments after they have become final. In addition, upon proper proof,
section 14.08 of the Family Code allows modification of divorce decree provisions regarding
conservatorship, child support, possession, and access. Prior to the addition of sections 3.703.77 to the Family Code in 1983, the courts had held that trial courts may "make orders
necessary to carry [a] judgment into execution consistently [sic] with its terms." Schwartz v.
Jefferson, 520 S.W.2d 881, 888 (Tex. 1975); cf Reynolds v. Harrison, 635 S.W.2d 845, 846-47
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, writ refd n.r.e.) (after judgment had become final, trial court was
permitted to extend deadline for specific performance). Courts, however, may not modify a
judgment under the guise of clarifying it. See McGehee v. Epley, 661 S.W.2d 924, 925-26
(Tex. 1983).
2. The Latin phrase "nunc pro tunc" is literally translated "now for then." See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 964 (5th ed. 1979).
3. The article will not consider appeals, the equitable bill of review, or collateral attacks,
which permit only a limited challenge to the judgment and impose a heavy burden on the party
attacking it.
An appeal is a limited review of specific errors that were presented to the trial court. See
PGP Gas Prod., Inc. v. Fariss, 620 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1981) (complaint on appeal must
have been made initially in trial court); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Kownslar, 496 S.W.2d
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II.
A.

PLENARY CONTROL OVER JUDGMENTS

Plenary Jurisdiction

Rule 329b provides that the trial court has plenary power over its
judgments for 30 days after each judgment is signed.4 If a motion for
531, 533 (Tex. 1973) (relief may not be granted on appeal unless it was requested in trial
court). In addition, only the errors that are designated as such and presented to the appellate
court can be the basis for a reversal. See Gulf Consol. Int'l, Inc. v. Murphy, 658 S.W.2d 565,
566 (Tex. 1983) (when defendant failed to appeal partial summary judgment taken against
him, court of appeals erred in reversing and remanding that aspect of case); Gulf Coast State
Bank v. Emenhiser, 562 S.W.2d 449, 452-53 (Tex. 1978) (grounds of error not asserted by
point of error or argument in the appellate court are waived).
Appellate review of default judgments by writ of error is permitted only where (1) the petition is filed within six months of the date of judgment, (2) by a party, (3) who did not participate in the trial, and (4) the error appears on the face of the record. See Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685
S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex. 1985).
A bill of review - an independent suit in equity to set aside a judgment that can no longer
be appealed - requires proof of these elements: (1) a meritorious defense to the cause of
action that supports the judgment, (2) which the movant was prevented from making by the
fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposite party, or by the mistake of a public official, or
because he was not served with process, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own.
Eg., Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406-09 (Tex. 1979). See generally Siskin, Bill of
Review--The Last Chance, 20 S. TEX. L.J. 237 (1980); Chamberlain, The Equitable Bill of
Review, 45 TEx. B.J. 484 (1982); Meyer, The Equitable Bill of Review in Texas, 41 TEx. B.J.
699 (1978).
It is often stated that there are four bases for collateral attack:
The judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack except on
the ground that it had (1) no jurisdiction of the person of a party or his property, (2) no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, (3) no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or
(4) no capacity to act as a court.
Austin Indep. School Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973). See generally
Hodges, CollateralAttacks on Judgments, 41 TEXAS L. Rv. 163 (1962). In recent years the
supreme court, relying on Rule 329b, has consistently held that when the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and the time for appeal has passed, the only way to set aside a final
judgment is a bill of review. See, e.g., Thursby v. Stovall, 647 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. 1983)
(after plenary jurisdiction expires, trial court cannot set aside judgment for lack of service of
citation); El Paso Pipe & Supply Co. v. Mountain States Leasing, Inc., 617 S.W.2d 189, 190
(Tex. 1981) (Rule 329b provides "exclusive remedy to attack a judgment which has become
final"); Akers v. Simpson, 445 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. 1969) ("defendant who is not served and
who does not appear may not. . . attack the verity of a judgment in a collateral proceeding").
See generally Dorsaneo, Res Judicata and CollateralAttack ST. MARY'S FOURTH ANNUAL
PROCEDURAL INSTrUTE A-l, A-15 (1982) (in four situations described above, judgment is
"void" rather than "voidable").
4. TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b provides in part:
(d) The trial court, regardless of whether an appeal has been perfected, has plenary
power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment within
thirty days after the judgment is signed.
(e) If a motion for new trial is timely filed by any party, the trial court, regardless of
whether an appeal has been perfected, has plenary power to grant a new trial or to vacate,
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new trial is filed within the 30-day period, the court's plenary jurisdiction lasts until 30 days after the motion for new trial is overruled in
writing or by operation of law.'
Within the period of plenary jurisdiction established by the rules,
the trial court's authority to modify its judgment is "virtually absolute."' 6 Of course, all changes must be supported by the law and the
evidence, and the court may not usurp the function of the jury.7 But
during this time period, the court has jurisdiction to grant a new
trial8 or make any changes it wants to make, and it can even vacillate
modify, correct, or reform the judgment until thirty days after all such timely-fied motions are overruled, either by a written and signed order or by operation of law, whichever
occurs first.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(d), (e).
5. See id. 329b(e). A motion to modify, correct, or reform a judgment also extends jurisdiction even though the movant does not seek another trial. See id. 329b(g). See generally
Guittard, OtherSignificant Changesin the Appellate Rules, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 667, 669 (1981)
(plenary jurisdiction extended where party seeks change in judgment but not new trial).
6. See Garza v. Serrato, 671 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
7. See First Nat'l Bank v. Walker, 544 S.W.2d 778, 781-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976,
no writ) (court cannot substitute its fact findings for those of jury). See generally Guittard,
Other Significant Changes in the Appellate Rules, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 667, 671 (1981) (plenary
power does not entitle court to render judgment contrary to jury's findings of fact, unless
proper motion for judgment n.o.v. made).
8. See TEX.R. Civ. P. 329b(d), (e); see also Pope & McConnico, PracticingLaw with the
1981 Texas Rules, 32 BAYLOR L. REV.457, 497 (1980) (express recognition of court's power
to grant new trial within 30 days of overruling original motion).
An order granting a new trial within the period of plenary jurisdiction is interlocutory and
not reviewable on appeal. See Cummins v. Paisan Constr. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex.
1984). In addition, an order granting a new trial can be controlled by mandamus only when
(1) it is wholly void, as when the trial court had lost jurisdiction, or (2) it is based on an
irreconcilable conflict in special issues. See, e.g., Johnson v. Court of Civil Appeals, 162 Tex.
613, 615, 350 S.W.2d 330, 331 (1961) (improper because trial court did not specify grounds on
which motion for new trial was granted); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Smith, 539 S.W.2d 234, 236
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ) (trial court ordered to set aside mistrial
granted because of partial jury verdict); Neunhoffer v. State, 440 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1969, writ refd n.r.e.) (district court clearly exceeded authority in issuing
mandamus against county court whose grant of new trial was outside scope of Johnson).
When a motion for new trial has been filed, and as of the 75th day a new trial has been
granted, the court loses jurisdiction to set aside the order granting the new trial. See, eg.,
Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 355, 346 S.W.2d 823, 826-27 (1961) (interpreting earlier version
of Rule 329b); Essex Int'l Ltd. v. Wood, 646 S.W.2d 322, 324-25 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no
writ) (when court has granted new trial and 75-day period has expired, it "loses its power to
reconsider the motion, and the case stands on the docket for trial as if no judgment had been
rendered"); Smith v. Caney Creek Estates Club, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 233, 234-35 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (because new trial granted, not overruled, as of 75th day, court
did not have 30 more days of jurisdiction).
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and change its mind back and forth.9 The court can, for example,
revise its earlier division of property in a divorce case,10 reassess its
award of attorney's fees" or personalty12 to
a party, and change its
13
rights.
parental
decision about terminating
B.

The Timetable for Plenary Jurisdiction

The trial court's period of plenary power does not begin to expire
until a written judgment is signed. 4 It makes no difference when the
case was tried, when the ruling was pronounced from the bench, or
when any post-trial hearings took place, even if weeks or months have
passed. Until a written judgment is signed, the judge has plenary jurisdiction to vacate or modify every ruling that has been made. 5 This
9. See Essex Int'l Ltd. v. Wood, 646 S.W.2d 322, 324-25 (rex. App.-Dallas 1983, no
writ) (within period of plenary jurisdiction, trial court can grant new trial and vacate that
action, reinstating its original judgment); see also Canavati v. Shipman, 610 S.W.2d 200, 20103 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ) (no error found when trial court granted new
trial but later reinstated original judgment).
Although the court is not required to give notice of any changes, that is the preferred practice. See Go Leasing, Inc. v. Groos Nat'l Bank, 628 S.W.2d 143, 144 n.2 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1982, no writ). The court may modify or set aside the judgment on its own motion.
See, e.g., Louwien v. Dowell, 534 S.W.2d 421, 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ)
(trial court may unilaterally modify or correct its initial judgment); Dickson & Assoc. v.
Brady, 530 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (ist Dist.] 1975, no writ) (court may
on its own motion modify, correct, reform, or vacate original judgment as justice requires);
Law v. Law, 517 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ) (court may modify
or amend without necessity of motion by any party).
10. See Allen v. Allen, 646 S.W.2d 495, 496 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no
writ) (trial court action in setting aside previous oral judgment not an abuse of discretion).
11. See Bray v. Bray, 618 S.W.2d 93, 96 (rex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ
dism'd) (no error in signing judgment different from that originally rendered orally if within
plenary jurisdiction).
12. See Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 878 (rex. 1978) (changing party entitled to
possession of property permissible within period of plenary power).
13. See Exparte Johnny G, 512 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no
writ) (initial oral ruling was properly changed by subsequent written judgment).
14. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 4. Rule 4 provides that in computing time periods, the date of
signing is not counted, and the first day after signing is day one of the 30-day period. See id. 4.
"[W]hen time is to be computed from or after a designated day, the designated day will be
excluded while the last day of the period is to be included." McGaughy v. City of Richardson,
599 S.W.2d 113, 115 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (emphasis in original).
When any party files a timely motion for new trial, the trial court's jurisdiction over the
entire case is lengthened under Rule 329b(e), and the appellate timetable is extended for all
parties. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b(e); see also id 356(a) & 386.
15. See, e.g., Bray v. Bray, 618 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ
dism'd) (trial court can sign written judgment that differs from one orally rendered); Verret v.
Verret, 570 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ) (trial court
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basic principle, however, is not universally recognized. One appellate
court recently ordered a trial judge to sign a particular judgment,
even though his plenary jurisdiction had not yet begun to expire and
he would have absolute, unreviewable authority to set aside the very
16
judgment he was commanded to sign.
retains control over case, irrespective of prior oral granting of divorce, until 30 days after
written judgment is signed); Louwien v. Dowell, 534 S.W.2d 421, 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1976, no writ) (regardless of oral pronouncement, court "may grant a new trial or otherwise
change its judgment at any time if no written judgment has been signed"). See generally Fullenweider & Feldman, Domestic Relations Judgments in Texas: Draftsmanship and Enforceability, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 19 (1977) (trial judge may change judgment or grant new trial at any
time so long as no written judgment has been signed).
16. See Flores v. Onion, 693 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
In Flores,the parties had agreed to settle their divorce case, and their handwritten agreement
had been approved and rendered by the court. Thirty-two days later, when a formal typewritten decree was presented for the court's signature, the husband had withdrawn his consent.
The trial judge "refused to sign the proposed decree and denied the motion to enter judgment."
Id. at 757. The San Antonio Court of Appeals, without even acknowledging the trial court's
plenary jurisdiction to grant a new trial, granted a conditional writ of mandamus and ordered
the judge to sign a judgment, even though he had indicated he would grant a new trial. See id.
at 757.
Faced with one litigant's withdrawal of consent, the trial judge had two options. He had the
discretion to sign the judgment because when he had rendered judgment earlier, both litigants
had agreed on all terms. See Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 528-29 (Tex. 1984) (court
may sign written judgment based upon settlement agreement that complies with Rule 11 if
parties consented to all terms at time of rendition). But the judge also had the discretion to
grant a new trial, and in effect that is what he had done. In view of the trial court's plenary
authority under Rule 306a and Rule 329b, one can only be puzzled by the Flores court's statement that the trial judge had a "ministerial duty" to sign the typed decree. See Flores v.
Onion, 693 S.W.2d 756, 757 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ). On the contrary, he
had plenary power to reject the typewritten decree and grant a new trial.
Under similar circumstances, a different court correctly refused to order a trial judge to sign
a judgment when one litigant had attempted to withdraw from a partial agreement. See
McNear v. Stewart, 608 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
McNear is consistent with the settled rule, overlooked in Flores, that even though a trial judge
who refuses to proceed to trial and judgment can be compelled to do so by the appellate court,
the appellate court cannot require the signing of a particular judgment. See, e.g., Crofts v.
Court of Civil Appeals, 362 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. 1962) (appellate court may mandamus
district court to proceed to trial and judgment, but "may not tell district court what judgment
to enter"); Tide Prods., Inc. v. Braswell, 586 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1979, no writ) ("mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of judicial discretion in any
certain manner"); Fenner v. Brockmoller, 404 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1966, no writ) (mandamus available when trial court refuses to act at all, but can not require
exercise of discretion in certain manner).
The Flores court also disregarded well-settled limitations on its own mandamus jurisdiction.
An order granting a new trial cannot be reviewed by mandamus except under extremely limited circumstances not present in Flore& See note 8 supra. Thus, the Flores court erred in
three respects: it ignored the trial court's plenary power to grant a new trial, it required him to
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Once a written judgment has been signed and the timetable has begun, the duration of the period of plenary power will vary from 30 to
105 days, depending upon (1) whether a motion for new trial is filed
and (2) when it is overruled in writing.I 7 If no one files a motion for
new trial within 30 days after the judgment is signed, the trial court
loses jurisdiction over the case on the 31st day, and thereafter the
judgment cannot be set aside by the trial court except by bill of review.II Except for nunc pro tunc corrections, any attempt by the trial
judge to tamper with the judgment on the 31st day or afterward will
be void for lack of jurisdiction and can be set aside by mandamus in
an appellate court.' 9
By contrast, if any party files a motion for new trial within the 30
days after the written judgment is signed, the trial judge's jurisdiction
is lengthened for a maximum of 105 days from the date of signing. 20

The court can shorten the 105-day maximum period by promptly
overruling the motion in writing, an event that starts the clock on the
final 30 days of jurisdiction.2 ' Often the victorious party, anxious for
the trial judge to lose jurisdiction, will schedule a hearing on the motion, have the motion overruled in writing, and thereby trigger the
appellate timetable. But if no written order disposing of the motion
for new trial is signed within 75 days of the date the judgment is
signed, the motion is overruled by operation of law. 22 Thereafter, the
sign a particular judgment, and it exceeded its mandamus jurisdiction by reviewing an order
that in effect granted a new trial.
17. See Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex. 1985) (since motion for new trial
was filed in wrong cause, court's plenary power ended after 30 days and decision made after
that time was void); Taack v. McFall, 661 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1983) (because motion for
new trial was overruled by operation of law after 75 days and judgment became final 30 days
later, court was without jurisdiction to grant motion for new trial after six months).
18. See Middleton v. Murf, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1985); Thursby v. Stovall, 647
S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. 1983).
19. See First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1984) (no motion for new
trial having been fied, judgment became final and court lost jurisdiction 30 days after judgment was signed); Taack v. McFall, 661 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1983) (because motion for new
trial was overruled by operation of law after 75 days and judgment became final 30 days later,
court was without jurisdiction to grant motion for new trial after six months).
20. See Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex. 1985); Taack v. McFall, 661
S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1983).
21. Cf. TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b(c), (e).
22. See id 329b(c), (e); see also Clark & Co. v. Giles, 639 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex. 1982) (if
no order signed within 75-day period, motion for new trial deemed overruled by operation of
law).
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court has 30 more days of plenary power.2 3
The court's ruling on the motion for new trial must be in writing
and signed. It is immaterial whether the motion is overruled in writing after the 75-day period, or whether it was overruled orally within
the 75-day period, or whether the court never acted on the motion at
all. In other words, every motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law on the 75th day, unless it is overruled or granted in writing
within the 75-day period.24 In view of these principles, one can never
rely on an oral ruling on a motion for new trial. Unless the court
takes action in writing, the motion is overruled by operation of law on
the 75th day.25
Under very limited circumstances, the timetable can be stretched
for 90 extra days. Recent changes in Rule 306a require the clerk to
send notice of all judgments to all parties by first class mail.26 Under
the revised rule, the court's plenary power can be extended for 90
additional days if a party proves that neither he nor his attorney received this officially mailed notice or had actual knowledge of the
judgment within 20 days after it was signed.27 If a party makes this
proof, most of the timetables - including plenary jurisdiction, filing
of motion for new trial, and perfection of appeal - begin to run on
the date such notice was received instead of on the date of signing.28
C. Final or Interlocutory?
For purposes of the time periods discussed above, the central date is
the date the judgment is signed. But the time periods mentioned in
23. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e); see also Clark & Co. v. Giles, 639 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex.
1982) (when motion for new trial overruled by operation of law, trial court retains jurisdiction
for 30 days to vacate, modify, correct or reform judment).
24. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
25. Frequently the trial court will exercise its plenary power and modify the judgment in
some way. When such a change is made, Rule 329b(h) provides that the timetable starts again.
Thus another period of 30 to 105 days will begin on the date the modified judgment is signed.
Eg., Garza v. Serrato, 671 S.W.2d 713, .714-15 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ) (when
trial court granted motion to modify judgment interest rate, Rule 329b timetables were extended for 30 more days).
26. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 306a(3).
27. See id. 306a(4); see also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Harris, 682 S.W.2d 670, 671
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (if party adversely affected has not received
notice within 20 days of signing, period for filing will begin on date party receives notice).
28. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4). The rule provides that the six-month deadline for filing
a petition for writ of error is not extended, and that in no event will lack of notice postpone the
beginning of the timetables later than 90 days after signing. See id. 306a(4).
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Rule 306a and Rule 329b do not even begin to run if the signed judgment is "interlocutory" instead of "final." Consequently, even if
many months have passed since a judgment was signed, the trial court
still retains plenary jurisdiction if the judgment is interlocutory. The
trial courts have continuing control over interlocutory orders and
may set them aside at any time prior to final judgment.2 9 To determine when plenary trial court jurisdiction still exists and when the
appropriate timetables begin to run, one must first distinguish interlocutory decisions from final ones.
To become final, a judgment must dispose of all parties and all issues in the lawsuit.3 ° Conversely, a judgment or order is interlocutory
if it does not completely dispose of all issues and parties, but instead
leaves the lawsuit in need of further judicial action to resolve the remaining areas of controversy. 3 1 A judgment, therefore, is interlocutory and not final if it leaves any part of the case "untried and
' 32
unadjudicated.
While simple two-party lawsuits still abound, there seem to be increasing numbers of multiparty lawsuits involving alternative causes
of action, mixed with counterclaims and cross-actions. Frequently, in

29. See Kone v. Security Fin. Co., 158 Tex. 445, 450, 313 S.W.2d 281, 286 (1958); Garrison v. Texas Commerce Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. See Schlipf v. Exxon Corp., 644 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex. 1982); North East Indep.
School Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966). See generally Walker, Amalgamation of Interlocutory Orders into One FinalJudgment, 3 ST. MARY'S L.J. 207, 207 (1971) (one
of two major reasons for appellate dismissal due to non-final order is failure to dispose of all
parties and all issues). In Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 295 S.W.2d 890 (1956), the
supreme court gave the following definition of a final judgment: "To be final a judgment must
determine the rights of the parties and dispose of all the issues involved so that no future action
by the court will be necessary in order to settle and determine the entire controversy." Id. at
337, 295 S.W.2d at 892.
31. See, e.g., Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. 1984) (order dismissing plaintiff's case was interlocutory because it did not dispose of defendant's counterclaim); Webb v.
Jorns, 488 S.W.2d 407, 408 (Tex. 1972) (order dismissing one of several parties was interlocutory "because it did not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit"); City of Arlington
v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 540 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (trial court denial of plea in abatement was interlocutory); see also Howard Gault &
Son, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 523 S.W.2d 496, 498-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no
writ) (when there are several defendants, judgment concerning one is not final until there is
judgment concerning all, unless there is a severance).
32. See Wilcox v. St. Mary's University, 501 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. 1973) (judgment was
not appealable because it left part of case "untried and unadjudicated"); Hall v. City of Austin,
450 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tex. 1970) (judgment that left part of case untried and unadjudicated
was interlocutory and therefore not appealable).
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these cases, the court will grant a partial summary judgment or default judgment, or act on some of the issues without disposing of the
whole case. Until the entire lawsuit is concluded, however, all such
rulings are interlocutory - subject to change by the trial court and
not ripe for appeal.
There are four ways to convert an interlocutory ruling into a final
one so the time periods for trial court jurisdiction and the perfection
of appeal will begin to run. The methods include a catchall clause,
nonsuit, severance, and merger.
1. Catchall Clause
Any judgment can grant complete relief and be final if it contains
the right wording. If the court intends to adjudicate fully and finally
all the issues between all the parties, the judgment should expressly do
so. But even if the judgment specifies in careful detail what relief is
granted and denied, the cautious practice is to include a catchall
Mother Hubbard clause that states, "All relief not expressly granted
is denied. '' 33 By its very terms, a judgment with this language disposes of the entire case and therefore is a final judgment. After a
conventional trial on the merits, even when the judgment does not
contain this clause, it will be presumed to be final.34 It should be
noted that this presumption of finality applies only after an ordinary
trial and does not apply to summary judgments or default
judgments. 3

33. The supreme court has expressly recommended that when judgments are meant to be
final they should include this clause. See Schlipf v. Exxon Corp., 644 S.W.2d 453, 454 (rex.
1982); North East Indep. School Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 898 (rex. 1966).
34. See North East Indep. School Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 897-98 (rex. 1966).
See generally Hodges, Preparationfor Appellate Complaint, 12 Hous. L. REV. 799, 809 (1975)

(discusses finality of judgment after normal trial proceedings).
35. See, e.g., Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. 1984) (no presumption that
summary judgment disposes of all issues and all parties); PHB, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 539 S.W.2d

60, 60 (Tex. 1976) (summary judgment does not create presumption of disposition of all parties
and issues); Etter's Welding, Inc. v. Gainsville Nat'l Bank, 687 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1985, no writ) (because default judgment is not a case regularly set for trial on

merits, presumption of finality did not apply); see also Dickerson v. Mack Financial Corp.,
453 S.W.2d 552, 554-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Aldridge

presumption of finality did not apply to default judgment, which was not a conventional trial
on the merits). But the presumption of finality does apply after brief, nonjury hearings on the
merits. See In re Allen, 692 S.W.2d 112, 116-17 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
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2. Nonsuit
When the court does not intend to adjudicate the entire case, and a
catchall clause would therefore be inappropriate, other devices must
be used if a judgment that grants only partial relief is to become final.
For instance, if the plaintiff, having obtained relief against one defendant, nonsuits the other defendants in the case, the judgment against
the first defendant will cease to be interlocutory and will become
final. 36
3. Severance
When the remaining parties or issues in the case cannot be nonsuited, a severance 37 can accomplish the same goal. Thus, if the court
has ruled on certain issues between certain parties, that part of the
case may be severed from the remainder of the case, creating a new
but smaller lawsuit in which the court's complete and dispositive action will become final.38 Most often this occurs when the plaintiff
36. The supreme court has stated the general rule concerning such interlocutory orders as
follows:
[Wihere an interlocutory order is entered disposing of one defendant, that order becomes
final, and there is a final judgment, when a subsequent order is entered disposing of the
remaining defendants.
H. B. Zachry Co. v. Thibodeaux, 364 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Tex. 1963); see also McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 127, 345 S.W.2d 706, 707 (1961); Corso v. Carr, 634 S.W.2d 804, 809-10
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The converse of the Thibodeaux rule also
holds true. A judgment that disposes of the entire case, and is therefore final and appealable,
becomes interlocutory if the court grants a new trial to one of several defendants. See Amcole
Energy Corp. v. Chapman, Inc., 666 S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
37. There is an important difference between a severance and an order for separate trials.
In Hall v. City of Austin, 450 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1970), the supreme court drew the following
distinctions:
A severance divides the lawsuit into two or more separate and independent causes. When
this has been done, a judgment which disposes of all parties and issues in one of the
severed causes is final and appealable. An order for a separate trial leaves the lawsuit
intact but enables the court to hear and determine one or more issues without trying all
controverted issues at the same hearing. The order entered at the conclusion of a separate
trial is often interlocutory, because no final and appealable judgment can properly be
rendered until all of the controlling issues have been tried and decided.
Id. at 837-38.
38. See, e.g., Parker v. Holland, 444 S.W.2d 581, 582-83 (Tex. 1969) (default judgment
after severance of question of nature and extent of undivided interest was final adjudication);
Corso v. Carr, 634 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (when
trial court granted individual defendant new trial and then granted nonsuit as to him, it effectively made judgment final and appealable); Howard Gault & Son, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank,
523 S.W.2d 496, 498-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ) (when there are several
defendants, judgment concerning one is not final until there is judgment concerning all, unless
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wants to pursue the remaining part of his case, or when it is a defendant who has prevailed and wants the partial judgment to become final.
The judge may grant a severance for the purpose of expediting an
appeal, while the rest of the case remains pending in the trial court,
but the appellate courts disapprove of this practice, which burdens
them with fragmented appeals.39
Procedural rules can have harsh jurisdictional consequences, and
this is especially true when a severance carves one lawsuit into two.
In Philbrook v. Berry, I for example, the trial court had signed a $2.5
million default judgment against one of several defendants, and on the
same day had severed the cause against that defendant from the remainder of the case.4" Thirty days later, the defaulted defendant filed
a motion for new trial, but the motion was filed in the original lawsuit
instead of the new cause created by the severance.42 On the 53rd day,
the trial court granted the motion for new trial and set the judgment
aside.43 The Texas Supreme Court ordered the trial judge to reinstate
the default judgment. 44 The court reasoned that the trial judge lost
jurisdiction after 30 days because the motion for new trial, having
been filed in the wrong cause, was ineffective to extend the trial
court's plenary jurisdiction under Rule 329b.45
4. Merger
When none of the above steps has been taken, the court retains
jurisdiction over all interlocutory rulings until it grants complete rethere is a severance); see also Schlipf v. Exxon Corp., 644 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex. 1982) ("no
appeal will lie from a partial summary judgment unless there is an order of severance").
39. See Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525-26 (Tex. 1982) (after
rendition of summary judgment denying reformation of deed, it was not an abuse of discretion
to expedite appeal by severing that issue from remaining declaratory judgment issue, although
it would have been "preferable" not to sever); Rutherford v. Whataburger, Inc., 601 S.W.2d
441, 442-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court strongly disapproved of
severance "granted for the express purpose of obtaining an advisory opinion prior to trial on
merits").
40. 683 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1985); see also Philbrook v. Berry, 679 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) (denying plaintiff's request for writ of mandamus), mand.
granted conditionally, 683 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1985).
41. See Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex. 1985).
42. See id. at 379.
43. See id. at 379.
44. See id. at 379.
45. See id. at 379. The court ruled that "[i]n addition to being ified timely, the motion for
new trial must be filed in the same cause as the judgment the motion assails." Id. at 379.
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lief in the case. Ultimately, when the court disposes of the rest of the
issues and parties, all interlocutory decisions as to certain parties or
issues merge and become final and appealable. 6 In other words,
when piecemeal rulings finally add up to a complete disposition of the
lawsuit, the timetable for plenary jurisdiction begins to run on all the
rulings when the last order is signed.
Ordinarily, one judgment will memorialize all the rulings in the
case, but the principle of merger also applies when the various rulings
are contained in different instruments. This is true even if the order
that finally winds up the case does not specifically mention the earlier
interlocutory order. 7 Because the trial court retains continuing control over interlocutory rulings, the court may change its mind and set
its previous orders aside as long as a judgment remains interlocutory. 48 The judge's modification of an earlier interlocutory ruling
need not be explicit, because the rendition of an inconsistent final
judgment implicitly sets aside the prior interlocutory ruling. 9
46. See Webb v. Jorns, 488 S.W.2d 407, 408-409 (Tex. 1972); Runnymede Corp. v. Metroplex Plaza, Inc., 543 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd). See generally
Walker, Amalgamation of Interlocutory Orders Into One FinalJudgment, 3 ST. MARY'S L.J.
207, 207 (1971) (series of interlocutory and unappealable orders often disposed of by the last of
such orders).
47. See Runnymede Corp. v. Metroplex Plaza, Inc., 543 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1976, writ refd). Runnymede sued Metroplex and Tom Terhagen, but on May 6, 1975
Metroplex was granted an interlocutory summary judgment. On February 24, 1976, the court
sustained Terhagen's plea in abatement and dismissed the suit without reference to either Metroplex or the previous interlocutory summary judgment. Considered together, these two separate rulings granted complete relief in the case. A "final judgment" was signed on June 17,
1976 which expressly incorporated both orders, and an appeal bond was filed on July 9th. The
court of appeals ruled that the judgment of February 24th was final even though it did not
mention the previous judgment. See id. at 5. Thus the order of June 17th was a nullity and no
appeal could be taken from it, because the trial court had lost jurisdiction 30 days after the
February order. See id. at 5.
48. See, e.g., Kone v. Security Fin. Co., 158 Tex. 445,450, 313 S.W.2d 281, 285-86 (1958)
(interlocutory default judgment against one party set aside by trial judge after jury verdict);
Burroughs v. Leslie, 620 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.) (in
rendering summary judgment for defendants, trial court did not err in vacating earlier default
judgment and granting motion for new trial); Dickson & Assoc. v. Brady, 530 S.W.2d 886,
887-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ) (partial take-nothing summary
judgment did not become final and appealable until one year later when remainder of cause
dismissed for want of prosecution).
49. See, e.g., Hill v. Robinson, 592 S.W.2d 376, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (take nothing judgment after jury trial set aside prior interlocutory default judgment against one defendant); Dickson & Assoc. v. Brady, 530 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975, no writ) (final judgment that is inconsistent with prior interlocutory judgment implicitly sets aside the earlier ruling); Dickerson v. Mack Financial Corp.,
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NUNC PRO TUNC CORRECTION OF JUDGMENTS

After the trial court loses plenary jurisdiction, it can no longer simply change its mind about the case and modify its judgment accordingly. Unless a petition for bill of review is filed, seeking to set aside a
judgment on equitable grounds, the court can correct only clerical
errors in the entry of its judgments.'
Because of the massive amount of paperwork that flows through
the trial courts, mistakes are inevitably made by lawyers and by
judges. Almost every judgment on the books was drafted and presumably proofread by a lawyer. Many were also reviewed and approved as to substance or form by the opposing attorney. All were
duly signed by a judge. Yet, in spite of the many opportunities to
discover and correct errors in judgments, mistakes are made and not
detected until after the judgment has become final.
It is hard to draft rules that permit the correction of genuine mistakes without opening the door to potential revision of every term in
every judgment whenever the judge has second thoughts. Each expansion of trial court power to correct judgments will be greeted with
requests by lawyers to exercise that power. To the extent that trial
courts can freely reopen or alter their judgments, the finality of judgments generally is threatened.
A.

The Rules Governing Nunc Pro Tunc Correction of Judgments

Rules 316 and 317, literally interpreted, appear to grant broad authority to correct mistakes and misrecitals in the judgment records.5 1
452 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (final judgment impliedly sets aside earlier inconsistent interlocutory judgment). In contrast, when the
earlier judgment is not interlocutory but final, a subsequent inconsistent judgment must expressly set aside the earlier one. S&e note 117 infra.
50. Cf Reavley & Orr, Trial Court's Power to Amend Its Judgments, 25 BAYLOR L. REv.
191, 194-98 (1973) (general overview of judgment nunc pro tunc); Note, Clerical or Judicial
Error-A Reminder to the Courts of the Purpose of the Nunc Pro Tunc Entry and the Basic
Distinction That Serves as a Guide for Its Application, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 100, 102-03 (1970)
(discussing clerical-judicial distinction).
51. Rules 316 and 317 provide:
Rule 316. Correction of Mistakes.
Mistakes in the record of any judgment or decree may be amended by the judge in open
court according to the truth or justice of the case after notice of the application therefor
has been given to the parties interested in such judgment or decree, and thereafter the
execution shall conform to the judgment as amended.
The opposite party shall have reasonable notice of an application to enter a judgment

nunc pro tunc.
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But the apparent breadth of these rules has been narrowed by
supreme court holdings that only clerical errors in the entry of judgments may be corrected nunc pro tunc, and that courts cannot correct
judicial errors in rendition.52
The general rule therefore may be stated as follows: After its plenary jurisdiction has expired, the trial court may correct only clerical
errors in the entry of judgment, and not judicial errors in rendition. 3
It is often said that a judgment nunc pro tunc may only correct the
record to conform to the judgment that was actually rendered.54
1. Rendition and Entry
The nunc pro tunc rules make a distinction between rendition and
entry of judgment. Judgments are renderedby the judge. Those judgments are subsequently entered in the court's minute book by the
court's clerk." It is not entirely clear whether the rendition of judgment must be in writing or whether it may be done orally. In Dunn v.
Rule 317. Misrecitals Corrected.

Where in the record of any judgment or decree of a court, there shall be any omission
or mistake, miscalculation or misrecital of a sum or sums of money, or of any name or
names, if there is among the records of the cause any verdict or instrument of writing
whereby such judgment or decree may be safely amended, it shall be corrected by the
court, wherein such judgment or decree was rendered, or by the judge thereof in vacation,
upon application of either party, according to the truth and justice of the case. The opposite party shall have reasonable notice of the application for such amendment.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 316, 317.
52. See Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877-78 (Tex. 1978); Universal Underwriters
Inc. Co. v. Ferguson, 471 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. 1971); Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450
S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1970); Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136, 138 (rex. 1968). It is occasionally
said that a clerical error is one that does not result from judicial reasoning or determination.
See Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936, 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Nolan v. Bettis, 562 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
53. See Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877-78 (Tex. 1978); Universal Underwriters
Inc. Co. v. Ferguson, 471 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. 1971); Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450
S.W.2d 56, 58 (rex. 1970).
54. See Ortiz v. 0. J. Beck & Sons, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.---Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ) (court may correct clerical error that causes "the official records of the
court to reflect inaccurately the judgment actually rendered"); In re E.S.M., 550 S.W.2d 749,
752 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ) ("clerical error occurs where minutes
of court do not correctly recite judgment actually rendered"); Reintsma v. Greater Austin
Apartment Maint., 549 S.W.2d 434, 436 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ dism'd) (proper
purpose of judgment nunc pro tunc is "to cause the record to speak the truth"); Perry v.
Nueces County, 549 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
("judgment nunc pro tunc does not disturb the initial judgment" but "brings the court records
into conformity with it").
55. See Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978); Ortiz v. 0. J. Beck & Sons,
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Dunn,56 the supreme court held that rendition occurs when the judge
pronounces judgment orally in court,5 7 but that holding has been
qualified by later developments. In Walker v. Harrison," the court
considered Dunn's approval of oral pronouncements but said that for
purposes of plenary jurisdiction, rendition occurs when a written
judgment is signed. 9 Rule 306a, recently rewritten to clarify the concept of "rendition," now provides that for purposes of plenary trial
court jurisdiction and perfection of appeal, rendition must be in
writing.'
In view of Rules 306a and 329b, an orally rendered judgment canInc., 611 S.W.2d 860, 863-64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ). In Burrell, the
supreme court stated:
Judges render judgment; clerks enter them on the minutes. . . .The entry of a judgment
is the clerk's record in the minutes of the court. "Entered" is synonymous with neither
"Signed" nor "Rendered."
Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978); see also Reavley & Orr, Trial Court's
Power to Amend Its Judgments, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 191, 192 (1973) (rendition and entry are
separate functions and may result in judgments differing in content). See generally IA. FREEMAN, LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 46, at 75 (1925) (rendition of judgment is judicial act, entry by
clerk only ministerial).
56. 439 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1969).
57. See id. at 832-33 . In Dunn, the court had pronounced judgment orally from the
bench in a divorce case. Two days later, the defendant died, and the plaintiff then fied a
motion to dismiss the case because of the death of a party before rendition of a written judgment. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and signed a written judgment. The
supreme court held that the oral judgment was valid, and the signing of a written judgment
was only a "ministerial act." See id. at 832.
58. 597 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1980).
59. See id. at 915. In Walker the trial court dismissed a case for want of prosecution, but
orally reinstated it within thirty days of the written dismissal order. The court did not sign a
written order of reinstatement until several months later. The supreme court held that the oral
reinstatement within the 30-day period of jurisdiction under Rule 165a was ineffective, and the
written ruling came too late. See id. at 915. Referring to Dunn's approval of oral judgments,
the Walker court held:
While it is true that orders and judgments may be orally pronounced in open court, a
different rule applies when there is a time limit placed on the court's jurisdiction to act on
a matter. When there is a time limit within which the court has jurisdiction to act, the
order must be in writing, specific, and signed by the trial judge.
Id. at 915.
60. Rule 306a(l) provides in part:
Beginning of periods. The date a judgment or order is signed as shown of record shall
determine the beginning of the periods prescribed by these rules for the court's plenary
power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct or reform a judgment or order and
for filing in the trial court the various documents in connection with an appeal, including,
but not limited to an original or amended motion for new trial, an appeal bond, certificate
of cash deposit, or notice or affidavit in lieu thereof, and bills of exception, and for filing of
the petition for writ of error if review is sought by writ of error, and for filing in the
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not have much permanence, and the significance of oral rendition
seems questionable.61 Under those rules, an oral judgment amounts
to little more than a tentative expression of the judge's intentions. An
oral judgment cannot be final or binding. It is by definition interlocutory - subject to change at any time by the trial court and not appealable to any appellate court.62 Until a written judgment is signed,
the trial court's 30-day period of plenary power does not even begin to
expire. Yet, in spite of these principles, courts still cite Dunn and
make broad and incorrect statements that a written judgment is not a
prerequisite to finality.63 On the contrary, as the rules are now
worded final rendition cannot occur until the judgment is reduced to
writing and signed.
Because oral pronouncements from the bench are often tentative
and incomplete, they can be reconsidered, supplemented, or modified
by the written judgment. Judges are not forever bound by their oral
pronouncements from the bench. When the writing adds to or differs
from the oral judgment first announced, it is presumed to be what the
judge intended. 64 The written judgment may expressly change the
appellate court of the transcript and statement of facts; but this rule shall not determine
what constitutes rendition of a judgment or order for any other purpose.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(1).
61. When Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1969), was decided in 1969, Rule 306a
directed attorneys, clerks, and judges to ensure that judgments were reduced to writing and
signed, but provided that failure to do so "shall not invalidate any judgment or order." See
TEX. R. Cirv. P. 306a (Vernon 1977). Dunn stressed the wording of Rule 306a in concluding
that oral judgments pronounced from the bench are valid. See Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d
830, 832 (Tex. 1969). Walker v. Harrison, 597 S.W.2d 913 (rex. 1980), qualified Dunn by
holding that judgments must be in writing and signed for the purpose of trial court jurisdiction. See id. at 915. Since Walker, Rules 306a and 329b have been amended to require in clear
language that none of the timetables begin until a written judgment is signed. See TEX. R.
Civ. P. 306a(l) (requiring that written judgment be signed before timetables begin); id.
329b(a)-(e) (trial court control over judgment does not begin to expire until judgment signed).
62. See, e.g., Bray v. Bray, 618 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ
dism'd) (court can render written judgment that differs from oral pronouncement); Verret v.
Verret, 570 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ) (plenary
jurisdiction not affected by prior oral decision or by death of party); Austin v. Austin, 553
S.W.2d 9, 11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ dism'd) ("trial court retains control over a
cause, irrespective of a prior oral decision, until 30 days after the written order is entered"); cf
Louwien v. Dowell, 534 S.W.2d 421, 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (under Dunn
v. Dunn, oral pronouncement valid, but only so long as it is not set aside).
63. See Odom v. Odom, 683 S.W.2d 135, 136 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ refd
n.r.e.) (written signed judgment not a prerequisite to finality); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Woody, 640 S.W.2d 718, 721 (rex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1982, no writ) (judgment rendered when decision affirmatively announced; written judgment not prerequisite to finality).
64. See Kostura v. Kostura, 469 S.W.2d 196, 198-99 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ
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terms that were rendered orally. In Allen v. Allen, 65 for example, the
oral judgment granted all the real property to the wife and all the
retirement plan to the husband.66 The written judgment, however,
divided the realty between the parties and gave a percentage of the
retirement plan to each.67 The appellate court held that the written
judgment had effectively changed the terms that were announced
orally.68 Similarly, in Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell,69 the supreme
court held that a written judgment granting prejudgment interest necessarily superseded the earlier oral pronouncement that had not
70
awarded the same relief.
2.

Clerical or Judicial Error

It is difficult to draw a bright line distinction between clerical and
judicial errors, since an error is not considered clerical merely because
it originated with an attorney or a clerk. 71 When the written judgment correctly sets forth the judge's intentions at rendition, and the
judge later learns that he acted upon false information, the error is
considered judicial. In Universal UnderwritersInsurance Co. v. Ferguson,72 the trial court had dismissed a lawsuit for want of prosecution
without giving proper notice to the plaintiff's attorney.73 Even
though the lack of notice resulted from the clerk's mistake in addressing notices to the lawyers, the supreme court held that this was a
dism'd); cf Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1970) (written judgment
granting prejudgment interest constituted rendition of judgment on that issue and necessarily
prevailed over previous oral rendition from bench which did not mention prejudgment
interest).
65. 646 S.W.2d 495 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
66. See id. at 495-96.
67. See id. at 496.
68. See id. at 496 (because court has inherent power to vacate its own judgment within
proper time limits, there was no abuse of discretion in setting aside prior oral decision).
69. 450 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1970).
70. See id. at 58-59.
71. See Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 185-86 (rex. 1973) (language erroneously
written into judgment by attorney becomes part of the judgment and constitutes judicial error).
See generally IA. FREEMAN, LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 145-156, at 281-306 (1925) (reporting
various examples of distinctions between clerical and judicial errors based on facts of individual cases); Reavley & Orr, Trial Court'sPower to Amend Its Judgments 25 BAYLOR L. REv.
191, 195-98 (1973) (general rule is simple to state - clerical errors correctable, judicial errors
not - but difficult to apply).
72. 471 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1971).
73. See id. at 29.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol17/iss2/3

18

Peeples: Trial Court Jurisdiction and Control over Judgments.

1986]

TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION

judicial error.7 4 The error was not clerical because it was not a mistake or omission that prevented the judgment as entered from accurately reflecting the judgment that was rendered." Similarly in Finlay
v. Jones,76 the trial court, believing the defendant had not answered,
granted a default judgment, unaware that a timely answer had been
filed with the papers of a different case by a negligent clerk." After
losing plenary jurisdiction, the trial judge had granted judgment nunc
pro tunc correcting the first judgment's erroneous recital that defendant had not filed an answer. 78 The supreme court held the nunc pro
tunc judgment improper because the erroneous recital was a judicial
mistake, even though it all started with the clerk. 79 Thus, clerical
mistakes that cause the rendition of an improper judgment are judicial
errors which cannot be corrected by a judgment nunc pro tunc.
B. Application of the Rules
A review of the cases reveals a great disparity between theory and
practice, because the rules seem to assume that mistakes are inherently either judicial errors in rendition or clerical errors in entry, and
that the court's task is simply to classify them correctly. In reality,
the courts seem to consider not only the nature of the alleged error
but also the character and persuasiveness of the proof that a mistake
really occurred in translating the judge's intentions into writing.
1. Clerical Errors
Surely no one would criticize nunc pro tunc correction of names
that have been erroneously stated,80 or typographical errors that cre74. See id. at 30.
75. See id at 29-30. In Ferguson, the plaintiff had a petition for bill of review pending in
the trial court. The supreme court stated that in the bill of review proceeding, it would be
necessary "to decide whether the facts of this case satisfy, or warrant the modification or
relaxation of, the rules ordinarily governing the right to a bill of review." Id. at 31.
76. 435 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1968).
77. See id. at 137.
78. See id. at 137.
79. See id. at 138-39. The supreme court felt the erroneous jurisdictional decisions made
by the trial court were not clerical because "the court has no more solemn judicial obligation
than that of seeing that no litigant is unjustly saddled with a judgment in the absence of notice
and a hearing." Id. at 139. Thus, the trial judge had a judicial duty to determine whether
proper service was effected and whether an answer was on fie, and once such a determination
was made, albeit mistakenly, the nature of the error became judicial. See id at 139.
80. See Whicker v. Taylor, 422 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, no writ)
("W. E. Wicker" changed to "E. W. Whicker").
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ate a variance between a jury verdict and the judgment, 8 ' such
changes being specifically authorized by Rule 317.2 Likewise, it is
hard to quarrel with nunc pro tunc corrections of the date of signing, s3 provided the trial court is not trying to resurrect plenary jurisdiction that has expired or permit the belated perfection of an
appeal.8 4 Since few attempts to modify previously rendered judgments are so universally accepted, the case law must be consulted to
decide what will constitute a permissible nunc pro tunc change.
When more substantial modifications have been upheld as clerical,
the courts have properly scrutinized the evidence and required solid
proof that a genuine mistake actually happened. 5 Thus, a summary
81. See Wingfield v. Bryant, 560 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ
dism'd) (appellate court ordered nunc pro tunc change of "25 feet" to "75 feet" as found by
jury), on remand, 614 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ refd n.r.e.);
Wedgeworth v. Pope, 12 S.W.2d 1045, 1047-48 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1928, writ refd)
(proper to change judgment from $12,008 to $1208, under statute which preceded Rule 317).
82. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 317 at note 51 supra.
83. See Ortiz v. 0. J. Beck & Sons, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ) (resolution of jurisdictional issues requires determination of when judgment actually rendered; date of judgment is type of error correctable nunc pro tunc); Cyrus v.
State, 601 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ rePd n.r.e.) (subsequent order
of trial judge correcting date of rendition of judgment was valid nunc pro tunc change).
84. See Anderson v. Casebolt, 493 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. 1973) (trial judge may not
enlarge time for appeal by signing second judgment that merely affirms but does not change
earlier one).
85. The prevailing view is that nunc pro tunc changes must be justified by "clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence." See, e.g., Wood v. Griffin & Brand, 671 S.W.2d 125, 129, 132
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (proof of clerical errors must be "clear, satisfactory, and convincing"); Davis v. Davis, 647 S.W.2d 781, 783 (rex. App.-Austin 1983, no
writ) ("judgment nunc pro tunc should be granted only if the evidence is clear, satisfactory,
and convincing"); Stuart v. City of Houston, 419 S.W.2d 702, 703 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1967, writ refd n.r.e.) (nunc pro tunc change "should be granted only if the evidence is clear, satisfactory, and convincing that a clerical error has been made"). An exception
to the cited authorities is South Texas Tire Test Fleet, Inc. v. Long, 594 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ). There, a default judgment for the plaintiff had also expressly, and in great detail, denied defendant's counterclaim for an injunction. More than four
months later when the judgment had become final, the judge signed a nunc pro tunc order to
"correct" his "clerical errors" - his granting the default judgment and his denial of the counterclaim. The court of appeals, after observing that the record did not disclose the testimony
that a clerical error had occurred, concluded that the trial judge's "personal recollection of the
judgment he had actually rendered. . . must be accepted as true." See id. at 542. This acquiescent attitude stands in stark contrast to the approach of all the other reported decisions in
Texas, and falls far short of the requirement of "clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence."
Moreover, South Texas Tire does not cite and cannot be reconciled with supreme court precedents. See Lone Star Cement Co. v. Fair, 467 S.W.2d 402, 405-406 (rex. 1971) (court could
not correct recital that defendant, though duly and legally cited and served, failed to appear
and answer); Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136, 137-39 (rex. 1968) (erroneous recital that de-
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judgment that granted recovery for the interest on a note but not for
the principal was held correctable nunc pro tunc, when supported by
a docket entry, the judge's recollection, and a summary judgment affidavit.16 Similarly, one court has held that failure to award attorney's
fees was a clerical error, where a letter from the judge to the attorneys
showed that he had intended to award them. 7 It has also been held
proper to correct the child custody terms of a divorce decree that
transposed "Petitioner" and "Respondent," where the decree itself
contained contradictions and the conduct of the parties confirmed
that the names had been reversed." These cases are by no means
exclusive, as numerous other cases echo the "solid proof"
requirement.8 9
2.

Judicial Errors

The cases characterizing attempted nunc pro tunc changes as judicial and therefore void fall into three categories. In the first group of
cases, the correction appears to be an afterthought by the trial judge
and not a real mistake in writing the judgment. Typically, only the
scantest of evidence suggests that a mistake was made in reducing the
judgment to writing. For example, after nine months a trial court was
not allowed to change its earlier final judgment, which commanded a
litigant to build a fence of brick, to specify that the fence be built of
fendant had been served and had not answered was a judicial error and not correctable nunc
pro tunc).
86. See Petroleum Equip. Fin. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 622 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (personal recollection of judge raises presumption
supporting finding of clerical error).
87. See Hutcherson v. Lawrence, 673 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
88. See Bockemehl v. Bockemehl, 604 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dalas 1980, no
writ). In Bockemehl, it was the judge's recollection, confirmed by his docket notation, that the
Respondent wife would have custody. The decree appointed Petitioner husband as managing
conservator, but then contradicted itself by ordering Petitioner to pay child support and reciting that the best interest of the child would be served by appointing Respondent managing
conservator. See id. at 469-70.
89. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 647 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ)
(trial court's recollection and docket entry were bolstered by evidence at trial; nunc pro tunc
order upheld after comprehensive review); Holway v. Holway, 506 S.W.2d 643, 646 (rex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1974, no writ) (docket notation, which was consistent with judge's customary
practice, supported nunc pro tune change despite judgment's being six years old); Zamora v.
Salinas, 422 S.W.2d 249, 251-52 (rex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial
court within authority in changing dismissal from "with prejudice" to "without prejudice,"
even though 13 months had gone by, where motion for dismissal and transmittal letter to court
confirmed mistake made).
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wood.9" Similarly, a court was powerless in 1979 to delete from a
1975 agreed order one of the heirs to an estate under the earlier judgment.91 In addition, when a judgment against a business entity
proved hard to collect, the trial court was not allowed to add individual partners as defendants and grant relief against them.9 2 Nor
could a trial court use a nunc pro tunc order simply to change its
award of a disputed item of personalty 93 or to alter its decision about
prejudgment interest. 94
Of similar import is the second class of cases, in which the judge
has rendered judgment upon an erroneous factual conclusion. The
Texas Supreme Court has held that when the original judgment mistakenly recited that defendant had not answered and thus a default
judgment was rendered, the erroneous recitals could not be corrected
nunc pro tunc. 95 Similarly, it was improper for a judge to change his
mind about granting a $1300 offset simply because he later learned
that the jury had already deducted that amount in reaching its verdict. 96 These decisions are sound because after plenary jurisdiction
has expired, erroneous rulings on the law or the facts should be corrected only by the appellate courts. If the rule were otherwise, there
would be no time limits on the presentation of new facts or authorities
to the court. Judgments would be forever vulnerable if the law allowed nunc pro tunc revision whenever a mistake of fact or law was
later made known to the judge.
In the third group of decisions, one suspects that the judgment
drafted by the lawyers and signed by the judge incorrectly granted or
denied relief, but the proof in the record does not demonstrate that
the court actually meant to do otherwise. Under these circumstances,

90. See Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 185-87 (Tex. 1973).
91. See Humphries v. Chandler, 597 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no

writ).

92. See Caliva v. Texas Constr. Material Co., 380 S.W.2d 641, 644-45 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1964, no writ).
93. See Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877-78 (Tex. 1978). In Mathes the trial
court's action was upheld as an exercise of its plenary power, even though the judge thought he
was acting nunc pro tunc. See id. at 878.
94. See Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1970) (trial judge not
allowed to alter award of prejudgment interest nunc pro tunc).
95. See Lone Star Cement Corp. v. Fair, 467 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Tex. 1971); Finlay v.
Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136, 138-39 (Tex. 1968).
96. See Shelby v. Shelby, 517 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (where recorded judgment correctly states actual decision, mistake in
reflecting court's true subjective intent does not justify nunc pro tunc change).
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the nunc pro tunc amendment has been termed "judicial" and not
allowed. For example, when a judgment impliedly, but mistakenly,
denied relief under North East Independent School District v. Aldridge,97 it was deemed a judicial error. 98 Further, when a judgment
wrongfully but expressly granted relief against a party in his individual capacity, 99 or denied relief against others, 100 the error was judicial
and not correctable nunc pro tunc.
The cases are difficult to harmonize, but most of them can be explained by this rule: If clear and convincing evidence proves that the
court's true intent was incorrectly translated into writing, the error is
clerical and may be corrected nunc pro tunc.
C.

Procedureand Evidence
1. Notice

Rules 316 and 317 require "reasonable notice" of applications to
enter a judgment nunc pro tunc.10 1 These rules, however, do not
specify how much notice must be given or the form it must take. The
three-day notice requirement of Rule 21 a10 2 seems grossly inadequate
because the respondent may need to rehire his attorney, evaluate the
grounds of the motion, and investigate the evidence. It is also not
clear whether the harmless error rule applies when notice was not
97. 400 S.W.2d 893, 897-98 (Tex. 1966). Aldridge held that when judgment is rendered
after a conventional trial on the merits, the appellate courts will presume for purposes of appeal that all relief not expressly granted is denied. See id. at 897-98.
98. See City of Houston v. Deshotel, 585 S.W.2d 846, 850-51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) (judgment granting relief against city but silent about individual
defendant, impliedly was take nothing judgment against individual); see also Home Ins. Co. v.
Greene, 443 S.W.2d 326, 329-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969) (judgment granting relief
for certain parties, but silent as to others, impliedly denied all other relief), affid, 453 S.W.2d
470 (Tex. 1970).
99. See Shepherd v. Estate of Long, 480 S.W.2d 51, 54-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (improper for nunc pro tunc order to delete recovery against estate's
temporary administrator in his individual capacity and as sole surviving heir).
100. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Williams, 603 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ) (where agreed judgment denied intervenor's claims for relief, court
could not make nunc pro tunc change 18 months later, when alleged error was discovered).
101. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 316, 317 at note 51 supra.
102. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a. Rule 21a provides that every notice mandated by the rules,
with few exceptions, may be served by delivery of notice to the party or his attorney, either in
person or by registered or certified mail. See id. 21a. The rule further provides that no matter
who effectuates the service, be it attorney, party, sheriff, or other person, three days notice
shall be given. See ia 21a.
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given.103 Some courts have held that lack of notice was not fatal because there was no showing of harm."° Other courts have held that a
judgment nunc pro tunc rendered without notice is void. 105
Perhaps the harmless error rule, which presupposes that the litigants at least had an opportunity to be heard, should be relaxed where

there has been an ex parte nunc pro tunc change. The dissatisfied
party, however, should be required to detail the evidence he would
have presented if there had been a hearing. Only if the evidence raises
a fact issue should the matter be remanded for a new hearing.
2.

Evidence

Rule 317 appears to permit the correction of judgments only when
"there is among the records of the cause any verdict or instrument of
writing whereby such judgment or decree may be safely amended.""

But the reported decisions have not required such tangible proof. In
most cases, the alleged mistake is not shown by a written instrument,
and the courts have usually accepted the judge's personal recollection
and docket notations as evidence of what the judgment was supposed
10 7
to say.
103. See id. 434. Rule 434 provides that the court of appeals shall not reverse a judgment
for a new trial unless the error complained of was "reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment." See id. 434. Rule 503 sets forth the
same rule for the supreme court. See id. 503.
104. See Ex parte Thomas, 536 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1976, no writ) (ordinary courtesy demands notice be given, but failure to do so does not make
court's order void); Law v. Law, 517 S.W.2d 379, 381 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ
dism'd) (no showing of injury from defect in notice). The only authority cited by the Thomas
court for its holding is Payton v. Hurst Eye, Ear,Nose & ThroatHosp. & Clinic, 318 S.W.2d
726, 734-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958, writ refd n.r.e.). Since Payton involved a modification of judgment during the period of plenary power, when the court may make changes
on its own initiative, it does not support the holding in Thomas.
105. See Johnson v. Hanson, 575 S.W.2d 361, 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no
writ) (because Rules 21a and 316 require notice, failure to give notice makes a judgment nunc
pro tunc void); Cargill, Inc. v. Van Deweghe, 284 S.W.2d 216, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, no writ) (nunc pro tunc judgment without notice a nullity). Because Johnson relies
on three cases decided before 1941, when the harmless error rule became law and ended the
era of presumed error, its reasoning appears questionable. Cf Williams v. Pitts, 151 Tex. 408,
410, 251 S.W.2d 148, 150 (1952) (court refused writ of mandamus to litigant seeking judgment
nunc pro tunc, because he had not given notice of his motion in trial court); Go Leasing, Inc.
v. Groos Nat'l Bank, 628 S.W.2d 143, 144 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ) (stating
that notice must be given but deciding case on other grounds).
106. See TEx. R. CIv. P. 317 at note 51 supra.
107. See, eg., Wood v. Griffin & Brand, 671 S.W.2d 125, 130-31 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1984, no writ) (judgment nunc pro tunc may be supported by docket entries and by
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Such evidence, however, has its difficulties. Reliance on what the
judge personally remembers "subjects erstwhile clear and reliable
court records to the undesirable hazard of meaning only what the
judge who signed them later recalls to have been his intent at the
time."" ' And for some unknown reason, the cases that give credence
to docket entries have not mentioned the supreme court's 1977 holding that docket entries "cannot be used to contradict or prevail over a
final judicial order."0 9
Whether a mistake is clerical or judicial is a question of law, and
the trial court's decision on this issue is not binding on an appellate
court.110 The issue of whether a mistake actually occurred, however,
is a question of fact. 1 The original judgment is presumed to be correct as written, and the burden of proving a clerical error rests on the
movant. 1 2 The Texas Supreme Court has not defined the precise evidentiary burden that must be borne, but several appellate cases have
stated that the evidence must be "clear, satisfactory, and convincing"
to support a judgment nunc pro tunc.1 1 3 While the cases have not
personal recollection of trial judge); Davis v. Davis, 647 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.-Austin
1983, no writ) (nunc pro tunc correction of clerical error may be based on judge's personal
recollection and docket entries); Bockemehl v. Bockemehl, 604 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (findings of clerical error supported by personal judicial recollection and docket notations).
108. See Knox v. Long, 152 Tex. 291, 300, 257 S.W.2d 289, 297 (1953) (Garwood, J.,
dissenting).
109. See N-S-W Corp. v. Snell, 561 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tex. 1977); accord Lone Star Cement Corp. v. Rush, 456 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(entries on docket sheet cannot be consulted for purpose of modifying "the plain effect of the
order actually signed").
110. See Lone Star Cement Corp. v. Fair, 467 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Tex. 1971); Finlay v.
Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex. 1968).
111. See Davis v. Davis, 647 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ); Bockemehl v. Bockemehl, 604 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dalas 1980, no writ).
112. See Kostura v. Kostura, 469 S.W.2d 196, 198-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ
dism'd) (signed judgment is presumptively what judge intended); see also Wood v. Griffin &
Brand, 671 S.W.2d 125, 131-32 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (circumstances of
case prevent indulging every presumption in favor of corrected judgment).
113. See, e.g., Wood v. Griffin & Brand, 671 S.W.2d 125, 129, 132 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1984, no writ) (proof of clerical errors must be "clear, satisfactory, and convincing");
Davis v. Davis, 647 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ) ("judgment nunc pro
tunc should be granted only if the evidence is clear, satisfactory, and convincing"); Stuart v.
City of Houston, 419 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (nunc pro tunc change "should be granted only if the evidence is clear, satisfactory, and
convincing that a clerical error has been made"). The necessity for "clear, satisfactory, and
convincing" evidence dates back at least to Stauss v. Stauss, 244 S.W.2d 518, 519 (rex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1951, no writ). Research has not located any authority expressing a lesser
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defined the exact meaning of "clear, satisfactory, and convincing,"
this standard undoubtedly falls somewhere on the continuum between
the "preponderance" standard and the "reasonable doubt" standard.
In other contexts, clear and convincing has been defined as "that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of
fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought
'
to be established." 114
Thus, as the courts have expanded the varieties
of proof that will support a nunc pro tunc change, at the same time
they have properly insisted that the proof rise to a high level of
persuasiveness.
3. Interlineation, New Judgment, or Separate Order?
Although there is authority that the nunc pro tunc correction may
be made by interlineation,"1 it is preferable to prepare a new judgment or a separate order. Even if only a few words are changed, a
new instrument is probably mandatory because the nunc pro tunc order must set forth (1) the procedure that has been followed, (2) the
correction that has been made, and (3) the basis for the nunc pro tunc
action.1 16 Further, it is vital that the corrected judgment specifically
vacate the earlier one, because a second judgment that does not vacate
17
the first is a nullity.
standard of proof, although the court in South Texas Tire Test Fleet, Inc. v.Long, 594 S.W.2d
540 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ), was certainly satisfied with minimal and
questionable proof that a clerical mistake had really occurred. See note 85 supra.
114. See In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980) (termination of parental rights);
State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (rex. 1979) (involuntary civil commitment).
115. See Rogers v. Allen, 80 S.W.2d 1085, 1086 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, no writ)
(better practice is to re-enter corrected judgment, but careful interlineation is acceptable);
Berge v. Panhandle Land Co., 145 S.W. 318, 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1912, no writ)
(courts abide but do not approve of interlineation corrections; better method is to vacate or
annul defective entry and replace it); see also Kollman Stone Indus., Inc. v. Keller, 574 S.W.2d
249, 250 n.2 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ) (remarking that nunc pro tunc interlineation is proper way of changing an error in initials of party). See generally Reavley & Orr,
Trial Court's Power to Amend Its Judgments, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 191, 201-202 (1973).
116. See Hutcherson v. Lawrence, 673 S.W.2d 947, 948-49 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no
writ); Quintanilla v. Seagraves Ford, Inc., 522 S.W.2d 274, 276-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1975, no writ); Stonedale v. Stonedale, 401 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1966, no writ); Ellison v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry Co., 306 S.W.2d 909, 910-11 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1957, no writ).
117. See, e.g., City of West Lake Hills v. State, 466 S.W.2d 722, 726-27 (Tex. 1971) (preferable procedure to expressly state first judgment is vacated, but adequate for later judgment
simply to show in some way that it vacates the first); Cavazos v. Hancock, 686 S.W.2d 284,
286 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ) (subsequent judgment that does not vacate the first is
a nullity); Law v. Law, 517 S.W.2d 379, 381-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ dism'd)
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4.

Time Limits

There are no definite timetables for seeking a nune pro tunc judgment in the trial court, or for challenging the trial court's action by
mandamus in the appellate courts. Nevertheless, even though the
statute of limitations does not apply, an effort to obtain a judgment

nunc pro tunc can be barred by laches. 18 Accordingly, the litigant
who discovers a clerical error should act promptly to have it set right.
In addition, once a clerical error has been corrected nunc pro tune,
under Rule 306a(6) the timetables for trial court plenary jurisdiction
and for perfection of appeal as to the corrected portion start anew
from the date of the new order.119 But even if the dissatisfied party
lets the time for appeal expire, that alone will not bar a belated action
for a writ of mandamus in an appellate court to set aside the void
order. 120

(second judgment, clearly on its face amending original decree, held sufficient to vacate first
judgment); see also Tunnell v. Otis Elevator Co., 404 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. 1966) (unless
record shows judgment vacated or set aside, it is "valid and subsisting until set aside by bill of
review").
118. In Waggoner v. Rogers, 108 Tex. 328, 330, 193 S. W. 136, 136 (1917) and Coleman v.
Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 495, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041-42 (1912), the supreme court held that a nunc
pro tunc proceeding is not an "action" within the statute of limitations. Even though limitations cannot be asserted, the supreme court in Coleman stated that laches can bar an otherwise
valid nunc pro tunc correction:
While it is our opinion that the right to have the entry of a judgment corrected or
amended so as to truthfully speak the judgment as rendered is not affected by statutes of
limitation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that it may not be defeated by the
laches of the party invoking it, under a correct application of that doctrine. It should be
also stated that it can never be availed of to the prejudice of the rights of innocent third
parties.
Id. at 495, 151 S.W. at 1043.
The party asserting the affirmative defense of laches must prove "(1) unreasonable delay in
asserting a legal or equitable right, and (2) a good faith change of position by another to his
detriment because of his delay." Stergios v. Forest Place Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 651
S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing City of Fort Worth v.
Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1964)).
119. Rule 306a(6) provides:
Nunc pro tunc order. When a corrected judgment has been signed after expiration of the
court's plenary power pursuant to Rule 316 or 317, the periods mentioned in paragraph
(1) of this rule shall run from the date of signing the corrected judgment with respect to
any complaint that would not be applicable to the original judgment.
TEx.R. Civ. P. 306a(6). The commentary to the rule makes clear that a nunc pro tunc correction does not "revive the court's expired plenary power with respect to complaints that could
have been made to the original judgment." See id. 306a(6) Comment 1.
120. See Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1973) (failure to pursue appeal
does not bar application for writ of mandamus in appellate court).
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CONCLUSION

Every legal system must reconcile two conflicting goals of the litigation process - ensuring that judgments are just and correct, and at
the same time, final and not subject to endless revision. Accordingly,
after a judgment has been signed and the lawsuit has apparently been
concluded, the rules give the trial judge additional time to reconsider
the relief granted while the facts are still fresh in mind. During this
period of plenary control, trial courts frequently rethink their decisions and make changes in their judgments.
At some point trial courts must lose jurisdiction, and the search for
perfect justice in individual cases must yield to society's requirement
that litigation come to an end. Because nunc pro tunc changes are
allowed only under limited circumstances - correction of errors in
drafting the written judgment, proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence - they do not really undermine the sanctity of judgments. Nunc pro tunc corrections of final judgments must be strictly
scrutinized because every effort to bend or loosen the rules to correct
a perceived mistake has the potential to undermine the stability of
judgments in general, and that would itself be an injustice to the great
mass of litigants whose cases have been concluded.
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